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I
In the writings of many past philosophers, the use of general terms such as
"humanity", "human beings", and (understood in the generic sense) "man"
belies the exclusion of women. Some philosophers made this exclusion explicit,
arguing that women are "naturally" inferior to men, that they should be ex-
cluded from the public, political and economic spheres, and that they should
obey their male superiors. Others have regarded it as unnecessary to justify these
views in terms of their own philosophical theory, assuming the inferiority and
subjugation of women to be "natural" or obvious.'
The question for philosophical commentators, historians of philosophy, and
theorists today is how to approach such cases. Should one, in discussing the
work of such philosophers, go on using terms such as "humanity" and "human
being" when it is clear that the philosopher in question did not mean to include
women? Is it legitimate to introduce explicitly inclusive language ("she or he")
in presenting this philosopher's views? Or should one replace terms like "the
human race" with "males"?2
In this article, I wish to explore this issue by looking at the case of Immanuel
Kant, concentrating on the work of his "critical" period. Kant is an interesting
case in point, since his writings are marked by an important tension between his
generic language and theory, on the one hand, and his views on the status of
women, on the other. Although a forceful advocate of the Enlightenment, with
strong views about the autonomy and equality of "all human beings," Kant
makes crucial exceptions for women, excluding them from the public, political
and economic spheres, and even denying them the capacity for personal auton-
omy.
After briefly presenting Kant's views on the relation between the sexes, 1
address the question how one should deal with the fact that he apparently only
means "men" (masculine) when he speaks of "human beings" in his moral and
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political philosophy. I will discuss several different answers to this question,
focusing on the approach taken in the majority of recent work on Kant's moral
and political philosophy, namely, the insufficiently critical appropriation of
Kant's generic language. I will argue that the arguments in favor of this approach
are inconclusive, and that instead of ignoring Kant's sexism and the tensions it
produces within his thinking, one should make them explicit and analyze the way
in which his views on the different characters of the sexes affect his moral and
political philosophy.
KANT'S VIEWS ON THE SEXES
In his works on moral and political philosophy, Kant generally uses the words
"Mensch"3 and "Menschheit" in discussing principles of ethics and politics.
These principles are explicitly meant to be valid for all human beings—even, as
with the categorical imperative, for "all finite rational beings." Kant asserts
both the equality and the autonomy of all human beings, as beings who are all
equally endowed with intrinsic worth.
Upon closer examination, however, the generic, gender-neutral language
proves to be misleading. For Kant regards men as naturally superior to women,
and women as unfit for the public, political and economic domain. He thinks of
the concept of a female scholar as bordering on a contradiction in terms, and
even attempts to ground the idea that women have a separate "vocation" and
"virtue" in the assertion that they can only act upon their inclinations.4
Kant's fullest account of his views on the sexes we find in the Anthropology
from a Pragmatic Point of View, in which he dedicates a section to the "Char-
acter of the Sexes" (VII,303-311). Here, he mentions three female character
traits that are central to his ideas about the female character, and how it differs
from the male character.5 From the outset he makes clear that he regards these
differences between men's and women's character as due to a divine "higher
order," and thus as necessary, unchangeable and purposeful (Anthr., VII,305f.).
First, Kant thinks women are naturally weak and fearful, whereas men are strong
and courageous (Anthr., VII,306). Kant presents women's fear as the direct
consequence of the biological fact that they bear children. This link with biology
makes it impossible to view this character trait as contingent and merely cultur-
ally determined. The salient point about this difference between men and women
18
 not so much that women, according to Kant, need male protection. More
important is the fact that he calls courage a part of virtue (Rel, VI, 183, cf. VI.57)
or even a virtue itself (Anthr., VII,256). In this light his statement that women
lack courage gains its significance. In his famous essay "An Answer to the
Question: What is Enlightenment?" Kant calls courage a necessary requirement
*°r taking the step to "Mündigkeit," i.e. for a human being's (Mensch) release
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from self-incurred tutelage (VIII,35). Women are supposed to lack courage.
Thus, again, what is claimed to be a distinctive characteristic of women, fear-
fulness, runs counter to a precondition for a "human" ideal, namely, that of
Mündigkeit.
A second characteristic is women's ability to manipulate men. Kant mentions
the "purposeful" side of this, namely, the fact that women contribute to men's
preparation for morality, because they force them to behave courteously
(VII,306). Note, the claim is not that women make this contribution by virtue of
their own moral standing. Quite the contrary. Although Kant grants them elo-
quence and modesty, these qualities do not imply a moral disposition at all.
Instead, Kant says that women force men to cultivate themselves because they
are "precociously shrewd in claiming gentle and courteous treatment by the
male, so that he finds himself fettered by a child through his own generosity and
led by it, if not to morality itself, at least to its clothing, the cultivated propriety
that is the preparatory training for morality and its recommendation" (VII,306,
emphasis added). This description of women as children is meant to emphasize
women's immaturity and should not be taken literally. Kant does not think
women are children.
This brings us to a third characteristic, namely women's incapacity for au-
tonomy. Unlike the first two characteristics, the third is not mentioned directly
by Kant, but it is implicit in many of his remarks, and can easily be brought out.
He writes: "[T]he woman should reign and the man govern; for inclination
reigns and understanding governs" (VII,309). A husband, says Kant, is to his
wife as a sensible minister "to his monarch who only thinks of amusement"
(VII,310). These and similar passages show that Kant assumes that women act
only on "inclination," whereas men have the capacity and the obligation to use
their reason. He calls it a "feminine principle" to hold that "[wjhat the world
says is true, and what it does, good" (VII,308), a "principle" that is obviously
hard to unite with the "Mündigkeit" Kant calls for in the Enlightenment essay.
In accordance with women's purported different capabilities, Kant distin-
guishes between "feminine" and "masculine virtue" (VII,307; cf. also
VII,257), asserting that both have a different "incentive," and that women have
"their own vocation" (ibid.). The significance of these statements from the
Anthropology becomes clear against the background of the Foundations of the
Metaphysics of Morals and the Critique of Practical Reason. There, Kant main-
tains (1) that the only principle of morality is the autonomy expressed in the one
fundamental law of pure practical reason (from which the only concept of virtue
is derived) (Pr.R.,V,3l), (2) that the only true incentive to morality is respect for
the moral law (Pr./f.,V,78), and (3) that "the" vocation of humanity is to act
morally and strive for the highest good (Pr./?.,V,146). By ascribing to women
a separate virtue, incentive, and vocation, Kant implies that the central tenets ot
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the critical practical philosophy are not applicable to women, and thereby com-
mits himself to a double standard.8
Because women, according to Kant, are weak, fearful, and guided by their
inclinations—that is, because women cannot act autonomously or think for them-
selves—they need the competent guidance of men. For most women, Kant
generally assumes, these guardians are their husbands.
There are some elements of reciprocity in Kant's account of marriage law in
the Metaphysics of Morals, for example the fact that husband and wife own each
other, and that they enjoy an equality of possession with regard to each other's
goods and sexual organs (M.M.,VI,278).9 With this, Kant declares his opposi-
tion to a one-sided exploitation of women by men. It would be a mistake,
however, to conclude from this that Kant views marriage as an enclave of
egalitarianism in a partriarchal society.10 As Susan Mendus correctly remarks,
this reciprocity does not imply equality. ' ' Kant holds that a husband has the right
to give orders and that his wife should obey. He is his wife's "master" (Herr)
because of his "natural superiority" (M.M.,VI,279). He has final decision-
making power in important matters.12
Thus, although Kant sometimes ascribes women "domination" in the domes-
tic sphere (she "reigns"), this dominant status is confined within limits that are
set by the husband. Moreover, it is a kind of domination that does not mean
much to him. Even where she "reigns" according to her inclinations, he still
"governs" and "relies on the right of the stronger to command in the house"
(Ani/!r.,VII,304).13 And when he gives in to her whims, that is only because he
has more important things to do: thus, a man "readily submits himself to her [his
wife's] regime" and motivates this by adding "so that he will not be prevented
from attending to his own business" (Anthr.,cf.Vll,2lO).
Women have to be legally represented by men. "A woman, regardless of her
age, is [declared to be] under civil tutelage; her husband is her natural curator,
though if a married woman has property of her own, it is another man" (ibid.,
VII,209). Tellingly, Kant treats the necessity of representing women in civil
affairs in a section of the Anthropology entitled "On Mental Deficiencies in the
Cognitive Power" (VII,204ff.). Women are under permanent male guardian-
ship. They have no legal competence, cannot go to court (ibid.), have no access
to the economic "market;" their domestic work is not recognized as labor, and
they are dependent on their husbands for support. Furthermore, they lack the
right to citizenship (MJli.,VI,314; T&P,VIII,295). They are "passive citi-
zens"—the term "citizen" here being little more than a euphemism.
This exclusion cuts across everything Kant holds valid and important for
"humans" (Menschen). Men (males) who are not "their own master" lack
active citizenship, too. But Kant himself feels that this is a problematic point,
and argues that the status of a passive citizen may never be definitive. However,
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in the same section where he argues that it must always be possible for ' 'every-
one" ("alle im Volk") to improve their status and to work up from "passive"
to "active" citizenship (VI,314f.), Kant rules out, without comment, the pos-
sibility of women ever achieving active citizenship. Similarly, in the essay "On
the Common Saying: 'This May be True in Theory, but it Does not Apply in
Practice,' " Kant states that the only requirement for being a citizen is "being
one's own master," only to add, as if it were a trivial afterthought: "apart from
the natural [requirement] (that one [es] is not a child, not a woman)"
(VIIU95).14
It is worth listing what women lack by not having proper citizenship. They
lack all three juridical attributes of a citizen, listed at the beginning of §46 of the
Metaphysics of Morals. They lack (1) the "lawful freedom to obey no law other
than one to which he [the citizen] has given his consent," (2) the "civil equality
of having among the people no superior over him except another person whom
he has just as much of a moral capacity to bind juridically as the other has to bind
him;" and (3) the "civil independence" that he does not owe his existence and
support to the arbitrary will of another person in the society (cf.VI,314). Thus,
women are dependent on an adult male's will for their existence and support,
they have a male superior as their guardian and master, and, finally, they have
to obey laws to which they have not been allowed to give or deny their consent.
Again, we can conclude that Kant uses a double standard, one applying to
"everyone" but actually excluding women, and another applying to women.
The presence of an implicit double standard in Kant's thought is also evident
from what he does not say. Although Kant usually is pre-eminently able to
distinguish between what is and what ought to be, he criticizes neither women's
purported mode of thought, nor their social status. If he applied the same stan-
dard to women as he applies to men, he would have had to advocate women's
liberation from tutelage, advocate granting them civil rights, and advocate better
education for girls. But he does nothing of the kind. Instead, as mentioned
earlier, Kant speaks of a "natural superiority" of men, and regards the character
and role of women as part of a higher purposive order, namely, as an "end of
Nature" (Anf/zr.,VII,305f.).
To summarize, there is a strong tension between Kant's generic theory (that
applying to human beings, to "everyone") and his gender-specific views (where
women represent the deviant case). Kant does not justify the inferior status of
women in terms of what he holds valid for "human beings," and such a justi-
fication would indeed be impossible.
Apart from this general tension, more specific difficulties emerge from Kant's
views on the different characters of the sexes, such as the obscure link between
biology (sex) and rational capacities, or the fact that Kant makes vast general-
izations about "the" character of women (and men) on the basis of very limited,
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and class-bound, experience. This list could be extended, but I will not elaborate
on these difficulties here. Nor will I discuss the issue of the implications of a
re-evaluation of Kant's views on the sexes for his moral theory, although I will
come back to this issue at the end of this essay. I wish instead to concentrate on
the question how to deal with Kant's views on the different characters of the
sexes and with the tension between his generic and gender-specific claims as they
stand. I shall first discuss three different answers to this question.
THREE APPROACHES TO KANT'S VIEWS ON THE SEXES
I
The first way of dealing with Kant's views on the different characters of the
sexes is simply to accept them and leave unacknowledged the tension between
these and Kant's otherwise generic language. This position has often been taken.
From the eighteenth century up to now, a number of scholars have explicitly
admired Kant's characterization of the sexes. For example, at an 1877 meeting
of Königsberg's Kant-Society, Benno Bobrik presented Kant's ideas in order to
deploy them against emancipatory tendencies of the day. According to Bobrik,
Kant's ideas promised to be of "general[!] interest," "especially in our day,
now that people are attempting to break through the natural boundaries of wo-
men's knowledge and understanding."15 About fifty years later, Karl Vorländer
calls Kant's description of women's character an "attractive characterization of
the female sex."16 And recently, Roger Scruton has praised Kant for writing
"eloquently on the distinction between the sexes."17 In writing about Kant,
these philosophers follow Kant in their tendency to use generic language but
exclude women, to speak about women only where Kant does so, and to pass
over any inconsistencies in this regard. Since, however, they fail to see the
tensions involved here, this approach is not adequate.
II
A second way of handling Kant's views on the sexes could be to reject Kant's
moral and political philosophy out of hand as thoroughly misogynous. If reason
does not prescind from gender, if Kant only thinks of reason in the full sense as
reason of men, then clearly his whole practical philosophy is irrevocably mis-
guided.
To defend this position one would have to argue for two separate claims. First,
one would have to show that there is no place where Kant transcends his "male"
Point of view, i.e. that in every passage in which he writes about the human race
he is actually writing just about men, and that wherever he writes "Mensch" he
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actually only means "Mann." Second, one would also have to show that there
is no way in which feminists can make use of his thought. The first claim is not
all that implausible, given the exceptional status that Kant accords to women.
The second claim, however, may be more difficult to make good on. For, even
if Kant's account of "masculine virtue" perfectly maps that of virtue simpliciter
(applying to human beings and other "finite rational beings"), the case must still
be made that his concept of virtue is thereby completely worthless. One would
have to prove that everything that Kant calls ' 'human' ' neither could nor should
count as truly human, i.e. that there are no elements in his ideal of humanity/
masculinity which he wrongly limits to the male sex.
Furthermore, it is worth noting that feminism is, to a significant degree,
anchored in the Kantian Enlightenment tradition and has often claimed that Kant
indeed wrongly limits concepts as respect for the individual, dignity, freedom,
equality, independence, autonomy to the male sex. And although many feminist
thinkers may wish to modify some of these concepts—for example, by replacing
Kant's stress on independence in favor of a model that stresses interdepen-
dence—they may wish to retain others.
Thus, those who would wish to take the strong position that Kant's philosophy
is thoroughly corrupt would have to argue for it, since it is not self-evident. A
rejection out of hand is not possible.
HI
The third way of dealing with Kant's views on the sexes and with the tension
between his generic and his gender-specific theory is the one almost universally
chosen in mainstream contemporary Kant scholarship. This third option is to say
that Kant's views on women are mistaken, that one should instead concentrate on
his more important philosophical achievements, and that one can simply leave
his theory about the sexes aside. Roger Sullivan has recently stated: "In general,
Kant's views about women and marriage . . . are still best ignored and forgot-
ten."18
Among philosophers who hold this view, two different attitudes can be dis-
tinguished with regard to how they write about Kant's "more important" philo-
sophical work: Some use explicitly inclusive language, others do not.19 I shall
first say something about the use of the "we"-form, the use of generic terms,
and the use of inclusive language, and then address the issue of whether one can
ignore Kant's views on the sexes or not.
Most authors who write about Kant's moral and political philosophy, even
many of those who are critical of the dependent status that Kant assigns to
women, nevertheless take over Kant's generic language. Throughout their dis-
cussions, they speak of "men" (meant generically) or "mankind,"20 even
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though often this cannot be understood as applying to women. Most also use the
"we"-form, as, for example, in explaining Kant: "We are as citizens to act 'as
if' such a contract existed."21 However, as shown above, Kant does not extend
citizenship to women. Thus, unless the author is assuming an entirely male and
"independent" readership, the use of "we" here is misleading.22
This problem is even more acute when authors use explicitly inclusive lan-
guage. However appropriate inclusive language generally is, in some cases it can
lead to significant distortions. It is, for example, a distortion of Kant's views to
speak of "the moral demands of both the Enlightenment and the moral law that
each person renounce all 'tutelage' and think for himself or herself."23 The
problem here is twofold. First, the inclusive language in the passage just quoted
is a distortion of what Kant meant. Kant did not say women should renounce all
tutelage and think for themselves; in all important matters they should leave it to
their husbands to decide and think for them. Second, using inclusive language in
rendering Kant's thought makes his sexism more difficult to identify. By sug-
gesting that he was more of an egalitarian than he really was, it occludes sys-
tematic tensions in Kant's thought and reduces the motivation for an investiga-
tion into Kant's actual views on the sexes.
Many authors who know Kant's views on the sexes nevertheless use generic
or inclusive language in presenting and discussing his moral and political theory.
They probably do so on the assumption that one can easily ignore Kant's gender
theory. This assumption often remains implicit and unaccounted for, but some-
times authors give reasons for it. I will here discuss three claims which can be
found in recent Kant-literature.
1. The first claim can be formulated as follows: Kant does not discuss the
characters of the sexes in his Critiques, therefore this issue clearly does not affect
transcendental philosophy and is not important.24
Against this several points can be made. First, the fact as such that Kant does
not discuss the issue in his Critiques does not show that it isn't important; the
most it can show is that Kant does not treat it as important, leaving unanswered
the question whether Kant is wrong or not in doing so. Thus, in this case, one
could just as well argue that Kant did not treat the issue in his Critiques because
he did not consider the subjugation and supposed inferiority of women to be a
serious matter.
The second point is more complicated. It is true that Kant apparently does not
want to give transcendental status to the sexual difference. Women as well as
men are rational beings, he says in the Anthropology (VII,303). Nowhere in his
critical work does Kant draw a distinction between two different kinds of reason
(which he could hardly be expected to do). From this, one might conclude that
as
 far as Kant's analysis of reason as such is concerned, this analysis equally
holds for reason in men and reason in women. But there is more to be said. For
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if women do have the same rational capacities as men, their legal and mental
tutelage stays unaccounted for. And, indeed, Kant seems to have in mind a sort
of explanation of women's condition. From another passage in the Anthropology
we can infer that he thinks the problem with women's reason is not so much that
it is different in nature, but that "its exercise involves deficiencies" (VII,208,
asserting the necessity of civil tutelage of women). If this is what Kant has in
mind, i.e. if he supposes that the exercise of women's reason "involves defi-
ciencies" and that this explains their condition, then indeed everything he says
about the dignity and vocation of humanity, for example in the Critique of
Practical Reason, applies de facto only to men (males). For these "deficiencies"
cause women to fall far short of the moral ideal that men ought to strive for.
Then, the sex/gender difference does exist on the level of a Critique, albeit not
visibly through stipulating a different reason for women, but invisibly through
the back door of saying that their reason is deficient. And this is important on the
level of transcendental practical philosophy itself, in that it effectively excludes
half of humanity from everything that constitutes the "worth" and "vocation"
of human beings.
Finally, the fact that Kant does not explicitly exclude women in the Critiques
does not imply that he included them. To assume that women are included since
Kant uses the word ' 'Mensch' ' is to beg the question. When Kant wrote, the onus
probandi in matters concerning the relationship between the sexes still rested
with the advocates of emancipation and equality. Therefore it may in this case be
more accurate to assume that women are excluded unless stated otherwise.25
2. The second claim to the effect that Kant's views on the sexes can be ignored
runs as follows. Kant's pre-philosophical assumptions should be distinguished
from his main philosophical concern. Thus, for example, in the Metaphysics of
Morals, Kant's assumption of the "natural superiority" of men (VI,279) belongs
to the category of pre-philosophical assumptions, whereas his real achievement
lies in the central principles of his political philosophy. The former are inessen-
tial details that can be left aside, while the latter meets the standard of a priori
justification that Kant himself regarded as most important.26
Now of course it is possible to make a distinction between essential and
inessential elements in Kant's writings, and indeed one can sometimes leave out
an inessential element without affecting the rest at all. Thus, for example, Kant
could presumably have changed his views concerning the nutritiousness of the
first mother's milk (£i/.,IX,456) without affecting the principles of his theory of
education. But not all "pre-philosophical assumptions" are inessential in this
sense. Moreover, the distinction between essential and inessential elements is
usually more difficult to draw then in the example just given.
If one wants to justify ignoring what Kant wrote about the sexes with the claim
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that it is inessential, it should be shown that these views are inessential, easily
removable details—but this would be difficult. For, to stay with the example of
the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant's views on the sexes imply particular political
institutions, a split between the public, political and economic male-dominated
sphere on the one hand, and the domestic, reproductive female sphere on the
other, a division of labor according to sex, an undervaluation of reproductive and
domestic labor. All of these elements of Kant's political philosophy are inti-
mately connected with his views on the sexes, thus making it impossible to
regard the latter as inessential and negligible.
3. The third claim used to justify ignoring Kant's views on the sexes is that we
have to see that Kant is a child of his time, that we "must not forget to study his
opinions in the light of that day,"27 that he is subject to "historical limita-
tions,"28 and that "he is not unique in the fact that he reflected some of the
prejudices of his time."29 Sometimes references to Kant's biography are added,
to the effect that Kant, as a bachelor who lost his mother early on and avoided
all contact with his sisters, was "not the man to do justice to women."'
With regard to this third claim, two points deserve discussion, one concerning
the contents of the claim itself (a), the other concerning its presuppositions (b).
a. It is true that views of male superiority and female inferiority were more
widely held in Kant's time than they are now. Studying Kant's views "in the
light ofthat day" may make us more lenient in judging him as a person, however
critical one may still be of his views. But there are limits to this clemency. In
Königsberg, at the end of the eighteenth century, the "historical limitations"
were not insurmountable. I will mention some examples, which show that Kant
held on to his views against different kinds of resistance.
To begin with, Kant was familiar with the existence of learned women, such
as the well-known Mme. du Chatelet and Mme. Dacier, whom he mentions in
his early essay "Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime"
(1764).31 He might have taken their accomplishments as proving that at least in
this respect women and men shared equal abilities. Instead, he suggests, with
sarcasm and contempt, that they might as well have beards (11,230)—implying
that learned women are not really women at all. In the Anthropology his reaction
is still voiced in a similar tone: "As for the scholarly woman, she uses her books
in the same way as her watch, for example, which she carries so that people will
see that she has one, though it is usually not running or not set by the sun"
(VII.307).
Further, Kant met women as a part of his social life. Many were well-educated
and eager to discuss philosophy or politics with him, but he refused. If women
Persisted, Kant would no longer behave courteously towards them.32 He pre-
ferred to discuss recipes with women, to the frustration of some of his female
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guests. On one occasion a guest reportedly exclaimed: "It really seems, dear
professor, as if you regarded all of us as mere cooks.""'
One of Kant's regular guests and friends was Theodor Gottlieb von Hippel
(1741-1796), mayor of Königsberg. Hippel is the author of the book Über die
bürgerliche Verbesserung der "Weiber ("On the Civil Improvement of Women"
1792).34 In this book Hippel argues in detail for more civil rights for women and
tries to disprove most of the traditional legitimations for their subordination. It is
uncertain whether Kant ever read the book, but he most probably knew of its
existence and of the views held by his friend.35
As these examples show, Kant could have held different views on the status
of women. Therefore, there is insufficient basis for excusing Kant's views on the
matter as a mere product of the time.
b. A more fundamental problem with the third claim's reference to historical
and biographical limitations is the following. Knowledge of biographical details
and of general opinions of a particular period can often be of help for clarifying
some philosopher's views by telling us where or how she or he got them. But it
cannot affect the relative importance of these views themselves within the phi-
losopher's work, i.e. it cannot reduce or enlarge the part they play within the
larger whole. Thus, the fact that Kant had a pietist upbringing provides no
argument for ignoring or downplaying the emphasis on "Gesinnung" in his
practical philosophy. Similarly, the fact that either personal circumstances or
general opinions in his time—or, for that matter, the work of Rousseau—
informed his views on the sexes provides no argument for ignoring these views.
So even if one would be willing to excuse Kant for holding them, this would not
by itself entitle him or her to ignore these views. The issues of what caused or
influenced Kant, and to what extent Kant is to be held responsible for his views,
do not affect the relative importance of these views in terms of their impact on
other parts of his moral and political philosophy. This importance has to be
assessed by means of a systematic analysis of Kant's system of thought, and
cannot be decided by historical or biographical data.
An example of what may happen when one too easily leaves aside Kant's
views on the different characters of the sexes and their social, political and
economic roles can be found in the book by Harry van der Linden, Kantian
Ethics and Socialism (1988). Van der Linden mentions that Kant excludes
women from citizenship. But except for one sentence (pointing to the fact that
this exclusion involves a contradiction), he does not discuss the issue, only states
that "historical limitations" play a role (198). Nonetheless, he phrases much of
his discussion of Kant's political philosophy in the "we"-form. What I wish to
indicate here, however, is how his lack of reflection on the sexism in Kant's
political philosophy is mirrored in his own project.
Van der Linden describes the "over-all aim" of his book as "constructing a
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viable Kantian socialist ethics" (p.x). The largest section of his book consists of
an extensive (and often illuminating) discussion of Kant's moral and political
philosophy and his philosophy of history. Here he accentuates the social dimen-
sion in Kant's moral philosophy and tries to reformulate Kant's political philos-
ophy along socialist lines, partly by mending inconsistencies in his thought,
partly by further developing some of his views, for example with regard to the
role of political institutions. Van der Linden holds that socialism overcomes
significant social and economic inequalities taken more or less for granted by
Kant, such as economic inequality and the division of labor between classes. His
conclusion is that "socialist economic institutions instantiate the moral ideal,
because they are to be defined as democratic institutions that aim at the satis-
faction of the needs of all human beings" (164, emphasis added). But this
conclusion seems far too strong. The author never discusses the social and
economical inequalities between the sexes, nor the traditional division of labor
between men and women that one finds in Kant's work. These aspects of the
Kantian framework remain completely unchallenged.
As I have argued, taking over Kant's generic language without comment is
problematic. Moreover, neither of the claims here discussed seems strong
enough to justify ignoring Kant's sexism, and paying too little attention to the
questions that emerge from Kant's sexism can lead one to unwittingly reproduce
much of it. In what remains, I wish to outline a fourth approach, one that better
accounts for the tension between Kant's generic language and his gender-specific
remarks.
OUTLINE OF A BETTER APPROACH
In order to avoid distortions and ambiguities in representing Kant's thought,
authors who discuss his moral or political philosophy need to make explicit the
tension that exists between what Kant writes about "human beings" and what he
says about "women." Although there may be specific cases where this tension
is not relevant, one should be alert for instances in which Kant's views on the
different characters of the sexes do play a role. And whenever there is such a
case, it deserves at least some discussion. Thus, for example, the fact that Kant
excludes women from citizenship deserves as much critical discussion as does
his exclusion of male "passive citizens."36
Making the tension explicit is going to affect the use of language in repre-
senting Kant's thought. There is, unfortunately, no simple linguistic solution to
the problems that Kant's views on the sexes bring with them. For neither inclu-
sive language nor naive reproduction of his use of "humanity," "human," etc.
will suffice. Using inclusive language (e.g., "Kant thought that every human
being should free herself or himself from tutelage") will not do because Kant did
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not think inclusively, and because it disguises Kant's exclusion of women. The
same also goes for using Kant's own language (the ambiguous "Kant thought
that every human being should free himself . . . "). A third alternative, namely
replacing Kant's generic language by terms referring to men only ("Kant thought
that every male should free himself . . . "), will not do either, because it would
mean ignoring the fact that Kant spoke of the human species ("Gattung")
instead of the male sex, even though he did so in a contradictory way.
In the absence of any simple, convenient linguistic device, any attempt to
make explicit the tensions in Kant's thought will require some intervention in
Kant's language, e.g. by commenting on his use of "human," "we," "citi-
zen," and by avoiding expressions such as "our liberties" or "our political
rights," "we as citizens," if women are excluded. "We" as the general subject
of philosophical discussion can only be used in a gender-neutral sense, unless
explicitly stated otherwise.37 There are countless other ways to draw attention,
where appropriate, to Kant's limitation of his argument to men, such as inter-
jected clarifying remarks, discussions, digressions, footnotes and annotations.
The choice will mostly depend on one's creativity and style, on the context of
argument and on the sort of text that is written.
Compared to commenting on and discussing Kant's thought, systematically
appropriating Kant's political philosophy requires even more caution, if one does
not wish to buy into its gendered presuppositions. For example, political theo-
rists who wish to use a Kantian framework, and who wish to overcome Kant's
polarization of the sexes, need to do more than introducing inclusive language
and declaring that women can be treated as men. If one ignores Kant's ideas on
the status of women, and simply treats his account of property, citizenship, etc.
as applicable to women as well as to men, one still does not question Kant's
polarization between the sexes on a fundamental level. Such an approach retains
Kant's definition of the political domain (which is closely tied up with his views
on the sexes) and leaves much of the division between masculine and feminine
spheres in Kant's writings intact. One would only give women access to the
masculine sphere, while remaining silent about the activities that Kant thought
were to be performed by women, such as reproductive labor, care, and house-
keeping. Thereby, one would still keep the latter outside of the range of political
philosophy. Moreover, the ways of life, the standards and structures that devel-
oped in a male-dominated society, now dressed up in the clothes of equality,
would remain unchallenged.
Truly overcoming the dichotomy would require a thorough re-evaluation not
only of the concept of femininity, but also of that of masculinity in Kant's work.
Only at that point will it be possible to rethink the meaning of "human." The
results of this—comprehensive—enterprise will significantly shape the answer to
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the important, but difficult question of what implications the re-examination of
Kant's views on the sexes would have for his moral theory of the Foundations
of the Metaphysics of Morals and the Critique of Practical Reason. A prereq-
uisite for all of this is an analysis—only sketched here—of the way Kant's views
on the different "characters" and spheres of men and women are embodied in
his work.
Washington University in St. Louis
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